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RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: IMPLICATIONS, CHALLENGES, AND
OPPORTUNITIES
Allison Fetter-Harrott*

I.

INTRODUCTION

What effect, if any, does recognition of same-sex marriage
have on public schools? This question may be viewed from a
variety of perspectives-social, psychological, historical, and
others. This paper seeks to identify from a legal perspective the
ways in which the struggle regarding governmental recognition
of same-sex marriage relates to public schools.
The connection between same-sex marriage and public
schools may seem attenuated, but a study of debates, cases,
and literature surrounding the controversy reveal three
prevailing issues: 1) whether or not recognition of same-sex
marriage would, as some campaigners have suggested, legally
compel a curricular change in public schools; 2) whether
parents have authority to challenge curricular interventions
that pertain to same-sex marriage; and 3) whether, and to
what extent, denying same-sex couples the right to marry
works in some jurisdictions an infirmity of those individuals'
parenting rights or has another negative effect, such as
creating greater uncertainty for children and schools. Before a
discussion of these three questions, to set the backdrop for the
discussion, Section II of this paper will provide a brief legal
history establishing context for the debate on same-sex
marriage recognition, and Section Ill will address the
prevalence of same-sex parented families in the United States.

* J.D.; Ph.D. student, Indiana University-Bloomington School of l~ducation. The
author thanks her mentors Dr. Martha McCarthy and Dr. Suzanne Eckes and
colleague Emily Richardson for their guidance and assistance in this article.
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AN ABBREVIATED HISTORY OF THE U.S. LEGAL STATUS OF
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELATIONSHIPS

Before considering what effect, if any, legal recognition of
same-sex marriage might have on public schools, it is helpful
first to identify briefly the legal context in which the same-sex
marriage debate arises. In its 1985 decision in Bowers u.
Hardwick, 1 the U.S. Supreme Court considered a challenge to a
Georgia law criminalizing sodomy, brought by an individual
arrested after engaging in a consensual sexual act with another
man in his own home. Relying on prior Supreme Court
precedent recognizing a field of privacy rights protecting
individual autonomy in the sphere of sexual activity,
procreation, 2 contraception, 3 interracial marriage between
members of the opposite sex, 4 and abortion, 5 the plaintiff
brought a claim alleging that the statute violated his rights to
engage in private associational activity under the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The Court
framed the question in Bowers as considering whether the
Fourteenth Amendment's fundamental right to privacy
extended to confer a "constitutional right of homosexuals to
engage in acts of sodomy." 6 As framed, the Court held no such
right existed, as-in the Court's judgment-it was neither
implicit in the preservation of liberty or justice, nor was it
"deeply rooted in th[e] Nation's history." 7
In the decade following Bowers, two important and
seemingly opposing developments arose pertaining to the basic
relational human rights of gay and lesbian persons. Congress
enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defines
marriage as the legal union of a man and a woman under
federal law 8 and provides that U.S. states and other units are
not required to recognize same-sex marriages joined under the

1. 178 U.S. 186 (1985).
2. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 5:35 (1912) (dealing with sterilization and
equal protection).
3. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 138 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, :l81 U.S.
479 (1965).
1. Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
5. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 131 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
6. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
7. !d. at 192 (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 1:31 U.S. 194, 50:l (1977)).
8. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
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laws of other states and unitsY Despite the relative longevity of
the statute, litigation continues, with disagreement among
courts as to DOMA's breadth and the extent to which it
complies with the Constitution. 10
Additionally, in Romer v. Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered the contours of equal protection rights for gay and
lesbian individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. 11 Romer was a challenge of an amendment
to the Colorado Constitution that nullified private and public
legal protections against anti-gay sexual orientation
discrimination, many of which were reflected in employment,
housing, and human rights ordinances throughout Colorado. 12
Because it was designed to remove these protections and to
expressly permit discrimination based on sexual orientation,
the Court viewed the amendment as crafted to broadly
disadvantage a distinct group. 13 This aim could not survive
even the Court's rational basis review, wherein a statute
passes constitutional muster where it "bears a rational relation
to some legitimate end." 14 The Court rejected the proposition
that the law was designed to protect the freedom of association
of those who disagreed with homosexuality; its means were so
sweeping as to bear no rational relation to those aims. 15
Accordingly, as a "status based" law designed to "classif[y]
persons undertaken for its own sake," the Colorado amendment
did not comport with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 16
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Bowers legacy was short-lived
after Romer. In Lawrence v. Texas, 17 the Court reconsidered
the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing sexual conduct
between two adults of the same sex. Framing the question in
9. 28 U.S.C. § 17:38C (2006).
10. Cf. In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the application
of DOMA to the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act was unconstitutional);
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D.
Mass. 2010) (finding DOMA unconstitutional); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F.
Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (same). But see Wilson v. Ake, 851 F. Supp. 2d 1298
(M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding DOMA enacted within Congress's powers).
11. 517U.S.620(1996).
12. ld. at 628.
13. !d. at 6:35.
14. Jd. at 631.
15. ld. at 685.
16. /d. at 624, 635.
17. 539 U.S. 558 (200:l).
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those terms, the Court re-explored its prior decisions regarding
sexual and reproductive rights and overturned Bowers,
explaining that the prior opinion "fail[ed] to appreciate the
extent of the liberty at stake." 18 Undoing Bowers, the Court
observed its own "emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex" and for
"protection to personal decisions relating to marriage" and
other private personal relationships. 19 Given the prominence of
these rights and because the Bowers holding "demean[ed] the
lives of homosexual persons," the Court found that state laws
criminalizing sexual activity between two consenting adults
violate fundamental liberty and privacy interests protected by
the substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 20 In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia remarked
that the majority and concurring opinions "le[ft] on pretty
shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples." 21
In recent years, courts, legislatures, and voters have
grappled with whether a state must, should, or should not
recognize same-sex marriage. Perhaps the most famous battle
over recognition of marriage of same-sex couples emerged in
California. In 2008, the California Supreme Court found in In
re Marriage Cases 22 that state statutes limiting marriage
recognition to only heterosexual couples violated California's
state constitution. Shortly thereafter, however, California
voters enacted Proposition 8, a constitutional amendment
stating "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid
or recognized in California." 23 After challenges to Proposition 8
were rejected by California state courts, challengers brought
their claims to federal court. In Perry u. Schwarzenegger,
plaintiffs alleged that Proposition 8 violated the U.S.
Constitution. 24 The district court agreed, finding that the
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause and the
substantive due process protections of the Fourteenth

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
21.

Id. at 567.
Jd. at 572-71.
!d. at 575.
ld. at 601.
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.

704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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Amendment because the exclusion of gay and lesbian
individuals from the institution of marriage bore no rational
relationship to any legitimate state interest. 25 Just days after
the Perry decision was decided, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit granted a stay halting enforcement of the
decision pending appeal. 26 The result is that marriages
between same-sex couples legally recognized in the period
between Marriage Cases and Proposition 8 are valid, but samesex couples cannot currently be newly married in California.
So although the U.S. Constitution protects the rights of
individuals to engage in private sexual and romantic
relationships with another adult of their choosing free from
criminalization, marital recognition of those consenting
relationships exists only in an evolving and devolving
patchwork of state-specific laws across the country. As of July
2010, six jurisdictions recognized marriage between individuals
of the same sex: Connecticut, 27 Iowa, 28 Massachusetts, 29 New
Hampshire, 30 Vermont, 31 and the District of Columbia. 32 Nine
states recognized domestic unions or civil partnerships in some
form. 33 Seven states recognized out of state marriages between
same-sex couples. 34 Twenty-nine states had constitutional
amendments either banning marriage between individuals of
the same sex or empowering the legislature to do so. 35 The
remammg states' statutes permitted in language or
interpretation recognition of only those marriages between

25. ld. at 100:3.
26. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
16, 2010).
27. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that
the statute limiting marriage as between only opposite-sex couples violated the
Connecticut constitution).
28. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (holding denial of marriage
benefit to homosexual couples did not comport with the equal protection clause of the
Iowa constitution).
29. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 911 (Mass. 2003) (holding
refusal to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the liberty and equality
requirements of the Massachusetts constitution).
:10. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 457:46 (2010).
:11. VT. STAT ANN. tit 15, § 8 (2010).
32. D.C. CODE§ 16-401 (2010).
3;1. Status
of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide,
LAMBDA
LEGAL,
http://www .I ambdal egal.org/pu b lications/ articles/nationwide-status-same-sexrelationships.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
:11. ld.
35. ld.
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opposite-sex spouses. 36 And undoubtedly, as judicial and
political challenges abound, the vitality of governmental
recognition of same sex marriage likely will continue to change
1n coming years.
0

0

Ill. THE PREVALENCE OF SAME-SEX PARENTED FAMILIES
Estimates of the prevalence of same-sex parented families
vary somewhat, perhaps relating to historical gaps in census
data, reluctance of gay and lesbian individuals publicly to
identify as such given fear of discrimination, and other factors.
However, some valuable data about same-sex parented families
has been identified.
Nearly one-quarter of same-sex couples in America are
raising a child. 37 These families live in every state 3R and in an
estimated 96% to 99% of the counties in the United States. 39 As
of the year 2000, it was estimated that one-sixth of gay men
had fathered or adopted a child and more than one-third of
lesbians had given birth to a child. 40 Another study estimated
that one-fifth of gay men and one-third of lesbians were raising
children in the home. 41 More recent studies estimate that
approximately one-fifth of same-sex couples are ra1smg
children in the household. 42 Additionally, gay and lesbian
parents are parenting or otherwise caring for tens of thousands
of American children through adoption and foster care each

36. ld.
37. Gary J. Gates, Census 2000, GLBTQ: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GAY, LESBIAN,
BISEXUAL, 'I'RANSGENDER, AND QUEER CULTURE (2001), http://www.glhtq.com/socialscienccs/census_2000.html.
38. ld.; TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARIUEDCOUPLE AND UNMARIUED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000 (200:3), http://www.census.gov/
prod/2003pubs/censr-5. pdf.
39. DAVlD M. SMITH & GARY J. GATES, HUMAN WGHTS CAMPAIGN, GAY AND
LESBIAN FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES: SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNER
HOUSEHOLDS (2001), available at http://www.urhan.org/UploadedPDF/1000-191_gl_
partner_households. pdf.
40. GARY J. GATES ET AL., URHAN lNS'l'JTUTE, ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY
AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2007), available at
http://www2.law.ucla.cdu/williamsinstitute/puhlications/FinalAdoption/{cport.pdf.
41. SIMMONS & O'CONNELL, supra note 38, at 10.
42. MARTIN O'CONNELL ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEW ES'l'JMA'I'~;s OF SAMESEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY Table 7 (2010),
available
at
http://www.ccnsus.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/SS_ncwestimates. pdf.
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year. 43 It is estimated that approximately 65,000 (or 4% of)
adopted children were living with gay or lesbian parents as of
2000. 44 And approximately 14,000 (or 3% of) foster children
were being cared for in foster homes by gay and lesbian foster
parents. 45
This data reveals that gay and lesbian parented families in
the United States are a social fact in communities across our
country. These families are not, as some would suggest,
relegated to a small number of certain communities. Rather,
they are raising children in virtually every locale in the United
States.
IV.

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND SCHOOLS: POLITICAL STRATEGY
OR IMMINENT CURRICULAR SHIFT?

In the American education system, general powers of school
governance rest with state governments. Typically, states
manage their curricular powers by enacting broad statutes
establishing
threshold
curricular
requirements,
recommendations, or prohibitions and by delegating powers to
state boards and departments of education. 46
So how do public schools find themselves thrown into the
debate over whether to recognize marriage of adult same-sex
couples? Schools, important territory in U.S. civil rights
struggles, offer particularly fertile soil for the so-called "culture
wars." Concepts like fairness and intolerance take on deeper
hues when reflected in the education of children. 47 And from a
practical perspective, advocates recognize what the courts have
long appreciated: we look to schools to reproduce our civic

4:3. GATES ET AL., supra note 10, at 7-8, 15.
14. /d. at 7.
45. /d. at 15.
16. See, e.g., Carolyn Depoian, Homosexuality, the Public School Curriculum and
the First Amendment: Issues of Religion and Speech, 18 L. & SEXUALITY 163, 169-70
(2009); Laura A. Jeltema, Legislators in the Classroom: Why State Legislators Cannot
Decide Higher Education Curricula, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 215, 223-21 (2004). See also
STEPHEN B. THOMAS ET AL., PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS 26 (6th cd. 2009).
17. Josie Foehrenhach Brown, Representative Tension: Student Religious Speech
and the Public School's Institutional Mission, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 26 (2009); Douglas
NeJaime, Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition: Accounting for Differences
Based on Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 303, 310-11, 328
(2009).
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virtues. 48 Because public schools provide most children with
their first and most enduring experience with government,
many advocates on a host of issues see schools as a place where
culture is made and remade. 49
Accordingly, some on both sides might view the debate
about same-sex marriage as perhaps no different from other
civil rights battles. Some claim that, embodying principles of
equality, schools should acknowledge same-sex couples to
reduce discrimination. Others worry that discussion of sexual
orientation in schools will undermine the roles of disapproving
parents' in their children's religious upbringing. 50 Some have
additionally alleged, however, that opponents of equal rights
for same-sex couples place children at the center of the debate
to foster unfounded fears. 51 These scholars have opined that
discourse critical of homosexuality has often in its
conceptualization of homosexual persons focused singularly on
sexual behavior. 52 That framing tends to provide an oversexualized conception of gay men and women, the argument
goes, a conception that paints them unfairly as a threat,
playing on fear. 53
Much recent public discussion about the recognition of
same-sex marriage and public schools surrounded the debate
leading up to enactment of California's Proposition 8.
Proposition 8 proponents through public advocacy alleged that
recognition of same-sex marriage would require schools to
"teach gay marriage," even to very young students. 54 For

48. See e.g., Plyler v. Doc, 157 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) ("[Ejducation has a
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.").
49. /d. See also NeJaimc, supra note 4 7, at ::332.
50. See, e.g., Charles J. Russo, Same-Sex Marriaue and Public School Curricula:
Preserving Parental Rights to Direct the /~duration of Their Children, 32 DAYTON L.
REV. 361, 361 (2007). Of course, where the debate is as to the extent to which schools
should discuss sexual orientation-and not just marriag(_~this debate will continue
regardless of same-sex marriage recognition.
51. See, e.g., Ne,Jaime, supra note 47, at 373; Joyce H. Hahn, Note, Proposition 8
and Education: Teaching Our Children to Be Gay? 19 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 119,
151 (2010); Ruth Butterfield Isaacson, Comment, "Teachable Moments':· The Use of
Child-Centered Arguments in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 98 CAL. L. REV. 121
(2010). See also Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 701 F. Supp. 2d 921, 100:1 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
52. NeJaimc, supra note 47, at 370-71.
53. See id.
54. Tamara Audi, ,Justin Scheck & Christopher Lawton, California Votes for Prop
8, WALL S-r. J., Nov. 5, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1225860567599
0067:i.html.
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example, the Proposition 8 ballot argument to voters asserted
that it:
[P]rotects our children from being taught in public schools
that "same-sex marriage" is the same as traditional
marnage ....

. . . If the gay marriage ruling [of the California Supreme] is
not overturned, TEACHERS COULD BE REQUIRED to
teach young children that there is no difference between gay
marriage and traditional marriage. We should not accept a
court decision that may result in public schools teaching our
own kids that gay marriage is ok. 55

Additionally, some Proposition 8 supporters advanced ads
that linked the recognition of same-sex marriage and schools.
One commercial advertisement depicted a young girl declaring
to her mother that she learned in school about a king who
married another king and, as a result, she believed she could
marry a princess. 56 A law professor narrator stepped into the
frame, stating: "Think it can't happen?" referring to the scene.
"It's already happened," he continued. "When Massachusetts
legalized gay marriage, schools began teaching second graders
that boys can marry boys. The courts ruled parents had no
right to object." Another narrator continues while a legal
citation appears, "Under California law, public schools instruct
kids about marriage. Teaching children about gay marriage
will happen here unless we pass Proposition 8." 57 The
advertisements imply not just that children would be exposed
to same-sex marriage as a social occurrence, but that if gay
marriage continued lawfully, schools would be legally
compelled to indoctrinate them as to the moral rightness of
same-sex marriage. 58 Those who advocate against recognition

55. Perry, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 930 (quoting the California Voter Information Guide
for the Nov. 1, 2008 California General Election. Proposition 8 Arguments-Voter
Information Guide 2008, http://www.voterguide. sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/ (follow
"Proposition 8" hyperlink; then follow "Arguments and Rebuttals" hyperlink)).
56. See Yes on 8 TV Ad: It's Already Happened, available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 0PgjcgqFYP4 (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
57. See id.
58. Hahn, supra note 51, at 160.
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of same-sex marriage have advanced similar arguments m
political contests over the right to marry in other states. 59
Many attribute the focus on schools with the success of
anti-same-sex marriage measures. Given these recent
campaigns, discussion is warranted as to whether the
recognition of same-sex marriage equality would incur some
legally compelled curricular shift in public schools. To do so, it
is relevant to consider the curricular schemes of some of the
states in which lobbyists have recently launched this argument
and, using these case studies, to consider the impact, if any,
that recognition of same-sex marriage might work on those
schemes.

A.

California

The Proposition 8 advertisement discussed above cited
California Education Code § 51933 for the assertion that
without the intervention of a ban on recognition of marriage
between same-sex couples, California schools were in danger of
being legally compelled to "teach gay marriage." 60 But the cited
provision, found in California's Comprehensive Sexual Health
and HIV/AIDS Prevention Education Act-quoted only in
highly selective part in the commercial-actually requires
schools to provide age appropriate, medically accurate, and
objective instruction that "teach[es] respect for marriage and
committed relationships." 61 The statute requires that a school
electing to provide a curriculum relating to sexual health and
relationships "be appropriate for pupils of all races, genders,
sexual orientations, ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and
pupils with disabilities." 62 The requirement that the
curriculum be appropriate for students of varying sexual
59. Sue Ellin Browder, Teaching Same-Sex "Marriage," NA'r'L CATH. HEr:., March
2009, available at http://www.ncregister.com/site/article/17432; Katherine Gregg,

Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage File Suit to Allow Unlimited Campaign Spending in
Rhode Island, PRO.JO.COM, Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.projo.com/news/content/same_
sex_marriage_lawsuit_09-28-10_KGK3KOD_v26.2308dfO.html; Eric Hussell, Question 1
TV Ad Sparks Charges of "Blatant Misinformation," BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Oct. 2, 2009,
http ://new. bangordai lynews.com/2009/1 0102/news/question -1-tv -ad -sparks-charges-oflsquobla tan t- m i sinforma tionrsquo.
60. See Yes on 8 TV Ad, supra note 56. See also Hahn, supra note 51, at 161-69.
61. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51933 (West 2009) (emphasis added). See also CAL. DEP'T
OF EDUC., HEALTH EDUCATION CONTENT STANDARDS FOR CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
KlNDERC:AHTEN THROUGH GRADE TWELVE (2008), available at http://www.cde.ca.gov/
be/st/ss/documents/healthstandmar08.pdf.
62. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51933 (emphasis added).
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orientations, plural, already contemplates discussion of samesex relationships. And the provision of the California Education
Code prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination likewise
contemplate generally more egalitarian handling of the topic. 63
The statute references a "respect" for marriage, which some
commentators have observed may imply, not instruction
regarding the rightness of same-sex marriage, but rather
respect in the form of appreciation of diversity. 64 But the
statute does not just reference instruction about respect for
marriage. It references the importance of teaching respect for
committed relationships/) 5 which certainly includes same-sex
romantic relationships. Accordingly, same-sex couples'
relationships already fit within the class of relationships which
students should learn to respect under the relevant curriculum
statute. And, as other commentators have observed, the
provision regarding teaching respect for marriage is optional,
emphasizes the importance of allowing parents to opt their
children out of sexuality education, provides parents wide
ranging access to materials, encourages students to consult
with parents and guardians regarding sexuality, and
recognizes parents as the primary teachers of sexuality
information. 66 Accordingly, when placed in context, arguments
or implications made politically the recognition of an
inalienable right to marry the adult of one's choice would
compel a curricular change on public school children appears,
at best, exceedingly weak.

B.

Maine

As in California, some opponents of the recognition of samesex marriage in Maine have additionally supported ballot
initiatives with arguments linking the recognition of marriage
rights with at least an implied legal compulsion of "teaching
gay marriage" in public schools. 67 In 2009, Maine's voters
passed Question 1, a ballot initiative invalidating a previously
enacted law recognizing same-sex marriage. 68 In commercials
63. !d.§§ 200, 212.6, 220.
64. Hahn, supra note 51, at 161-68.
65. !d.
66. See id. at 162, summarizing CAL. Enuc. ConE§§ 51933-34, 519:37-39.
67. See Russell, supra note 59.
68. Question 1 was titled "An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and
Affirm Religious Freedom" and stated, "Do you want to reject the new law that lets
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supporting the measure, a proponent stated that Question 1
"[had] everything to do with schools," and implored viewers to
"vote Yes on Question 1 to prevent homosexual marriage from
being taught in Maine schools." 69
These arguments beg the question of whether, as suggested,
recognition of same-sex marriage rights in Maine indeed would
work some legally compelled curricular shift. Maine's statutes
require that children in grades Kindergarten through grade 12
receive what is known as "Comprehensive Family Life
Education," including instruction on "human development and
sexuality, including education on family planning and sexually
transmitted diseases." 70 The statute on this curriculum also
requires that lessons be "accurate and age appropriate," that
they reflect community standards, emphasize the importance of
parental involvement in the development of attitudes, build
individual decision-making skills, and emphasize abstinence. 71
And parents have the opportunity to remove their children
from such lessons if delivered in public schools. 72 The Guiding
Principles for the Learning Results require that Maine's
students learn to be responsible and involved citizens able to
understand the "diverse nature of society." 73 Maine's Learning
Results, the set of general overarching standards for the state's
public schools, do not require explicit teaching of marriage or
sexual orientation. And so the implication that same-sex
marriage recognition would lead to a legally compelled
curricular shift is not supported in the legal authorities
governing Maine's curricula.

C.

Connecticut

In
Connecticut,
some
anti-same-sex
marriage
commentators, too, encouraged public concern over the link
between recognition of marriage rights and public school

same-sex couples marry and allows individuals and religious groups to refuse to
perform these marriages?" See Bureau of Corporations, Elections, 2009 Referendum
Tabulation, http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2009/referendumbycounty.html.
69. See Russell, supra note 59.
70. ME. REV. STAT. tit 22, § 1902 (2001).
71. Id.
72. Id.§191l.
73. ME. DEP'T OF EDUC., GUIIlJNG PRINCIPLES (1997), available at
http://www.maine.gov/education/lres/gp.pdf.
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curricula. 74 Connecticut state law compels the state board of
education to create guides to assist school districts in
composing curriculum on family health, including but not
limited to topics such as "family planning, human sexuality,
parenting, nutrition and the emotional, physical, psychological,
hygienic, economic and social aspects of family life." 75 But
exactly how to compose curriculum for such initiatives, or even
to teach them at all, is still reserved to local school boards/ 6
zones in which parents' and community members' views carry
significant weight. Nor are students required to take part in
such programs, if offered. 77
Connecticut state law prohibits discrimination based on
sexual orientation.n And Connecticut's state standards before
the Connecticut Supreme Court's ruling in Kerrigan that
schools would teach students to demonstrate respect for others
without
regard
to
sexual
orientation
and
other
79
characteristics. The Connecticut standards do not specifically
require public schools to teach anything about marriage in
school and already championed efforts to dispel sexual
orientation discrimination well before the decision in Kerrigan.
As such, the claim that same-sex marriage would legally
compel schools to "teach gay marriage" is not supported by
governing authority.

D.

Rhode Island

Relatively recent controversy has raised the same
curricular debate in Rhode Island. 80 Rhode Island statutes
mandate that schools teach a health curriculum. 81 This
includes mandatory health and family life courses and HIV and
AIDS education programs that involve accurate information on
pregnancy and transmission and prevention of sexually

71. See Browder, supra note 59.
75. CONN. G~:N. STAT.§ 10-16c (West 2010).
76. /d.§ 10-16d.
77. /d. § 1 0-16e.
78. ld.§10-15c.
79. See CONN. STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., THE CONNECTICUT FRAMEWORK: K-12
CURRICULAR GOALS ANIJ STANDAlWS (1998), available at http://www.sde.ct.gov/
sde/lib/sde/PDF/Curriculum/Curriculum_lioot_Web_Folder/ctframe.pdf.
80. Gregg, supra note 59.
81. IU. GEN. LAWS§ 16-1-5 (2010).
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transmitted infections, with a preference for abstinence. 82
Parents may elect to remove their children from these
courses. 83 And the Rhode Island standards governing sexuality
education, while contemplating that schools will teach students
about marriage, additionally provides that students will learn
age appropriate lessons 84 about dating, sexuality, and sexual
orientation as well. 85 The latter necessarily contemplates that
students will learn about same-sex couples. And so, as in other
states, there is little, if any, legal evidence that recognition of
marriage equality for same-sex couples necessarily would itself
legally work a curricular change on the state's schools.

E.

Political Strategy or Curricular Shift?

This non-exhaustive survey of states in which the "teaching
gay marriage" legal argument has been recently put forth
reveals its substantial weaknesses. Certainly, given the broad
national prevalence of same-sex parented families, who live in
every state and nearly every county of the United States,
schools in other states that teach children about family
structure or committed adult relationships by implication
should already be acknowledging the presence of those
families, regardless of the legal status of the parents'
relationships. And it is difficult to see how this issue is any
different than teachings that acknowledge families with
divorced or heterosexual unmarried parents, which are lawful
even though they conflict with some religious views. Typically,
and logically, same-sex marriage laws themselves do not
specifically mention education. In fact, recognition of same-sex
marriages would likely not require the kind of morally
indoctrinating "teaching gay marriage" against which same-sex
marriage opponents warn, just as failure to recognize gay
marriage does not prohibit a curriculum that permits schools to
instill in students respect for diversity of families and beliefs,
including those relating to same-sex relationships and
parenting. 86
82. Id. §§ 16-22-17, 16-22-18 (2001).
83. Jd.
84. R.I. DEP'T OF HEALTH, RULES AND REnULATIONS FOR SCHOOL HEALTH
PROGRAMS 10, 12 (2009), available at http://sos.ri.gov/documents/archives/regdocs/
released/pdf/DOH/54 7l.pdf.
85. Id. at 12.
86. Consider Ohio, a state with a constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex
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Even if in some states the curricular scheme is such that
campaign rhetoric like that discussed above presents a real
connection between curriculum and recognition of same-sex
marriage, those concerned about such curricular measures
have other avenues for advancing their agenda. Given that
curricular choices are often a matter of state-, district-, or
school-level decision-making, same-sex marriage opponents
may petition for curricular changes. 87 And if same-sex couples
are entitled to the fundamental right to join in marriage,
allowing the curricular lobbying process to play out is far more
just and democratic than denying an entire class of people
marriage rights-and the many personal, economic, familial,
and political rights and benefits that accompany marriage-to

marriage. The Ohio Revised Code requires schools to offer courses in health education,
including what Ohio terms "[v]enereal disease education." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3313.60(A)(5)(c) (LexisNexis 2009). This curriculum must stress an abstinence-only
approach to sexuality education, including emphasizing the risks of sexually
transmitted infections that accompany sexual activity, the side effects of sexual activity
outside of marriage, and recommending that students abstain from extra-marital
sexual activity. /d. § :l313.60ll(C)(l)-(7) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009). Despite the refusal
to recognize same-sex marriages, Ohio's education scheme necessarily contemplates the
consideration of same-sex parented families in age appropriate ways in the public
school curriculum. For example, the Ohio Department of Education's early learning
standards contemplate young children sharing their personal family stories and
traditions, which necessarily will include at least some classes acknowledging children
who hail from same-sex parented families. OHIO DEP'T OF EDUC., EARLY LEARNING
CONTENT STANDARDS 45 (2006), http://education.ohio.gov/GD/Templates/Pages/ODE/
ODEDetail.aspx'>Page=3&TopicRelationiD=l389&ContentiD=1629&Content=83592
(follow "Early Learning Content Standards" hyperlink). They provide that children
should learn about social units, like families, as well as differences in the structures
and habits of those units. !d. at 44. The early learning content standards advance the
quotation, "When all families are valued by society, all of society benefits." Id. at 48.
Perhaps most directly dealing with these questions, the list of books recommended to
fulfill these standards includes the book Heather Has Two Mommies, by Leslea
Newman and Js Your Family Like Mine? by Lois Abramchik and Barbara Cavallo.
0Hl0 DEP'T OF EDUC., EARLY LEARNlNC~PRTMARY CONTENT STANDARDS FOR SOCIAL
STUDIES 62-6:J
(2008),
http://education.ohio.gov/G D/Templates/Pages/ODE/ODE
Detai I. aspx? Page=3&TopicRela tion l D= 1389&ContentiD= 1629& Content=83592 (follow
"Early Learning-Primary Content Standards for Social Studies" hyperlink).
Additionally, the First Circuit has noted that a state in which same-sex marriage is
recognized might have a rational reason to teach about legal status of such
relationships. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 95 (1st Cir. 2008). The court's statement
did not, however, hold that the legal recognition of same-sex marriage required schools
to engage in such teaching. !d. at 96.
87. See Parker, 514 F.:Jd at 107; Kimberly Gee, Establishing a Constitutional
Standard that Protects Public School Teacher Expression, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 409, 422-24
(2009) (but students and parents "have no right to refuse or modify a curriculum with
which they disagree."); Christopher M. Morrison, High Stakes Tests and Students with
Disabilities, 41 B.C. L. RF:V. 1139, 1148 (2000) (states control education policy
decisions).
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guard against fears by some that doing otherwise would legally
work a curricular shift in public schools. Of course, this is not
to say that curricular initiatives identifying the diversity of
healthy families thriving in our communities, including samesex parented and married families, are inappropriate in
schools. In analyzing the existence of a relationship between
U.S. public schools and our nation's debate regarding
governmental recognition of same sex marriage, it is
appropriate to identify the extent to which legal and political
arguments made are based in legal doctrine, statutory
language, and curricular policy.
But this discussion would be incomplete if simply
challenging the campaign assertion that curricular change is
not legally required by recognition of same-sex marriage. We
live in a time when anti-gay discrimination and harassment is
rampant in our public schools, often with unacceptably
disastrous circumstances for young people. 88 In the debate
regarding what schools must, should, or should not teach with
respect to same-sex marriage and relationships, we must not
forget our duty to keep all students safe from victimization and
the potential benefits of curricular interventions designed to
foster peaceful appreciation of students' families and identities.

V.

PARENTAL SCHOOL CHOICE, CURRICULAR CONTROL, AND
"OPTING OUT"

No matter the efforts made to unite factions in the debate
over the recognition of same-sex marriage, some will object to
curricular references relating to same-sex marriage and
relationships. This controversy has arisen in states with and
without same-sex marriage equality rights. 89 Accordingly, this
discussion examines the features of parental curricular
objection rights relating to such objections. While these

88. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HATRED JN THE HALLWAYS: VIOLENCE AND
D!SCRIMINATJON AGAINST LES!lJAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSf;ENDEI{ STUDENTS IN

U.S. SCHOOLS 1-3 (2001), available at http://www.prideagenda.org/portals/
O/pdfs/Youth%20-%20Hatred%20in%20the'%20Hallways.pdf. See also Jeremy Hubbard,
Fifth Gay Teen Suicide Sparhs Debate, ABC NEWS, Oct. 3, 2010,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/gay-teen -suicide-sparks-debate/story?id= 11 788128.
89. Discussion of opt-outs and marriage recognition should acknowledge that
even absent same-sex marriage rights, questions of sexual orientation and the
curriculum will endure, as same-sex couples are part of society, even where their
marriages are unrecognized.

2]

RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

253

features are somewhat ambiguous under current law, recent
opinions offer some guidance.
Federal courts have long been trying to determine the
contours of parents' rights to opt their children out of school
measures with which they disagree. The most relied upon cases
arose in the early twentieth century. 90 In Meyer v. Nebraska,
the U.S. Supreme Court found that a state law prohibiting nonEnglish school instruction ran afoul of the liberty rights
guaranteed to all by the Constitution. 91 In Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, the Court struck down a compulsory attendance
statute as an infringement of parents' rights to direct their
children's upbringing. 92
Nearly half a century later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the
Court considered whether compulsory education statutes
violated the constitutional rights of Amish parents. 93 The Court
found Amish children could not be made to attend secondary
school without directly impeding their religious practice-by
requiring them to pursue courses of study and social pursuits
that conflicted with their beliefs and by literally delaying their
development in the labor of the Amish life. 94 The Court found
that the state could not produce interests in the statutes that
outweighed the parents' right to exercise their religion by
raising their children in the insular Amish tradition. 95
Modern decisions have grappled with questions of what
these cases teach regarding the exact contours of parental
autonomy to direct their children's education. What seems
clear is that parents may remove their children from public
schools where such schools' teachings and practices directly
impact their exercise of basic liberties. But the cases do not
interrupt the historical observation of deference to the state in
delineating the features of public school instruction. 96

90. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. :390 (1923).
91. Meyer, 262 U.S. at :199-101.
92. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 518-19.
93. 106U.S. 20~ 207(1972).
91. !d. at 215-18.
95. !d. at 221-29.
96. See, e.g., Russo, supra note 50, at 375 ("In refusing to apply parens patriae to
compulsory attendance [in Wisconsin v. Yoder], the Court did uphold the general
principle that the state has the authority to regulate education.").

254

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL
A.

[2011

Parent Control of the Curriculum

A widely publicized decision regarding parent challenges to
school curriculum was issued by the First Circuit in Brown u.
Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions. 97 Here, parents alleged that a
school assembly regarding sexuality-related topics, including
homosexuality, violated their children's privacy rights,
including their right to direct the upbringing of their
children. 98 The court received Brown as parental effort to
dictate the high school curriculum, and it gave that challenge a
chilly reception at best. 99 The court explained:
We think it is fundamentally different for the state to say to a
parent, "You can't teach your child German or send him to a
parochial school," than for the parent to say to the state, "You
can't teach my child subjects that are morally offensive to
me." The first instance involves the state proscribing parents
from educating their children, while the second involves
parents prescribing what the state shall teach their children.
If all parents had a fundamental constitutional right to
dictate individually what the schools teach their children, the
schools would be forced to cater a curriculum for each student
whose parents had genuine moral disagreements with the
school's choice of subject matter. We cannot see that the
Constitution imposes such a burden on state educational
systems, and accordingly find that the rights of parents as
described by Meyer and Pierce do not encompass a broadbased right to restrict the flow of information in the public
schools. 100

B.

Parent Notice and Opt-Out

Several courts have held that the Fourteenth Amendment
familial right to control one's children generally does not
provide the parent authority selectively to opt a child out of
classes or other generally applicable school rules that the
parent simply opposes, but some ambiguity lingers. 101 For
example, in its 2005 decision in Fields u. Palmdale School
97. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Martinez v. Cui,
608 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2010).
98. ld. at 529.
99. ld. at 534.
100. Id. at 53:-l-34.
101. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.:id 87, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing cases); Leehaert
v. Harrington, :1:12 F.:id l:H, 139-42 (2d Cir. 2008).
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District, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found
that the Fourteenth Amendment parental right did not grant
parents "a right to prevent a school from providing any kind of
information~sexual or otherwise~to its students." 102 Rather,
the court explained, while Myers, Pierce, and Yoder
demonstrated that parents have considerable authority
regarding the choice of whether to send their children to public
school, that right "does not extend beyond the threshold of the
school door." 103 There has been more controversy, however,
regarding the contours of a parent's right to opt a child out of a
school curriculum to which the parent objects.
A paradigm case in this sphere is Parker v. Hurley. 104 In
Parker, two sets of parents brought claims alleging that by
exposing their elementary school children to books that
depicted same-sex couples, the school violated their Fourteenth
Amendment familial right to raise their children and their
First Amendment Free Exercise rights to practice their
religion. 105 The plaintiffs in Parker rested their claims in their
asserted right to notice and opt out of public school curriculum
referencing the existence of same-sex partnerships. 106 One
family alleged that the district violated their parental rights by
refusing to give them notice and the opportunity to opt out
regarding a book sent home with their child in a "diversity book
bag." 107 The book was entitled, Who's in a Family? It depicted
various kinds of families, including families with same-sex
parent couples, and stated that a family is composed of those
who love one another most. 108 The family demanded that "no
teacher or adult expose [their child] to any materials or
discussions featuring sexual orientation, same-sex unions, or
homosexuality without notification to the Parkers and the right
to 'opt out.'" 109 The family later asserted their objections when
the child's first-grade classroom contained two books that
referenced same-sex parented families. 110 Other parents

102.
lO:l.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

127 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2009).
/d. at 1207.
514 F.:3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).
/d. at 90.

/d.
/d. at 92.
/d. at 92-93.
/d. at 93.
/d.
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alleged that their family's parental and free exercise rights
were violated when a teacher read to their son's second grade
class a book entitled King and King about a prince who marries
another prince. 111
Parker left unresolved numerous aspects of free exercise
jurisprudence as applied to public school curricular notice and
parental opt-outs. The court declined to identify a specific test
that applied to such claims. It considered carefully several tests
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, including the test
established in Employment Division v. Smith, which required
that neutral and generally applicable statutes incidentally
benefitting religious practice need only be supported by a
rational basis, as opposed to a compelling state interest, to
comport with the Free Exercise Clause. 112 The court rejected
the application of this standard in Smith to Parker because the
case did not call into question punishment for violation of a
rule. 113 The court likewise rejected the test in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 114 which found
invalid any statute targeting a specific religious group. 115 The
Parker court considered, but did not address, the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Sherbert v. Verner, 116 which held that in
individual benefit determinations, the government may not
substantially interfere with an individual's central religious
belief or practice unless justified by a compelling state
interest. 117 Joining the Second Circuit, the court rejected a
hybrid rights standard articulated in Smith's dicta referencing
application of strict scrutiny to state-imposed limits on
religious parental exercise. 118
Identifying the appropriate test in Parker was unnecessary,
the court explained, because each test required some showing
111. Id.
112. 191 U.S. 872. 879 (1990). See also Brown u. Hot. Sexy and Safer Productions,
68 F.::ld 525, 538-39 (1st Cir. 1995), where the First Circuit found that the racy
assembly did not violate parents' Free Exercise rights because its imposition was
neutral and generally applicable.
113. Parker, 511 F.3d at 95.
114. 508 U.S. 520, 5:11 <32 (1993).
115. Parker, 511 F.::ld at 96.
116. 371 U.S. 398 (196:3).
117. Parker, 514 F.:)d at 96. As the First Circuit noted in Parker, the lasting
impact of Sherbert is unclear, as at least one Supreme Court case has referred to its
rationale as having been rejected in Smith. See /d. at 96 n. 7 (quoting Gonzales v. 0
Centro Espirita Heneficiente Uniaodo Vegetal, 546 U.S. 118, 421 (2006)).
118. Id. at 98 (citing Leebacrt v. Harrington, 3:32 F.:id 131, 11:3-44 (2d Cir. 2003)).
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that the actions complained of burdened the plaintiffs' religious
practice in some way. 119 The plaintiffs in Parker, the First
Circuit explained, failed to show any "constitutionally
significant burden" on their rights. 120 The Court distinguished
the claims from the Supreme Court's opinion in Yoder: whereas
the Yoder plaintiffs sought the opportunity to retreat from
public education because it would interfere with their religion,
the Parker plaintiffs sought to engage their children in the
public school but to be free of those aspects of the curriculum
referencing phenomenon denounced by their religion. 121 Free
exercise, the court explained, did not require public schools to
"shield individual students from ideas which potentially are
religiously offensive, particularly when the school imposes no
requirement that the student agree with or affirm those ideas,
or even participate in discussions about them." 122
At least one commentator has opined that challenges like
Parker, which allege that the "mere exposure" of one's children
to the existence of family structures or relationships of which
their religions disapprove, inherently are at odds with the
concept of pluralism and tolerance underlying American
education. 123 This view is also in line with the practical
implications of modern U.S. public school classrooms. Imagine,
for example, a teacher leading a class discussion on family and
community, common in various states as referenced in
curricula above. While addressing the concept of family is
relevant to student development, each student brings varying
family stories. Many of those stories, not just those of children
with same-sex parents, will implicate some kind of activity that
may not be blessed by the religion of every child in the room.
Imagine the practical impossibility of acknowledging those
varying family structures and providing the parents of each
student whose religion may object to them with notice and the
opportunity to opt out. The effect of such a duty, given the
plurality of religious beliefs among public school children,
would be to make it virtually impossible for a teacher to
address those aspects of families. And though the contours of a

119. ld. at 98-99.
120. ld. at 99.
121. /d. at 99-100.
122. /d. at 106.
123. NeJaime, supra note 47, at 362-64. See also Mozcrt v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
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free exercise duty to opt-out a child may be less clear, courts
have consistently held that parent attempts to dictate the
curriculum's conformity with personal religious beliefs is not
within the ambit of personal rights guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. 124
Yet Parker did not foreclose entirely a parent or child's free
exercise right to opt out of a curricular intervention relating to
same-sex marriage. Significantly, the Parker court rejected the
proposition that Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions
applied on the grounds that the age differences between the
two groups of children warranted greater parental deference,
implicating a stronger interest in notice and opt-out
opportunities for younger children. 125 Additionally, the court
pointed specifically to the kinds of interference with religious
beliefs that-unlike mere exposure-might trigger a child or
parent's free exercise rights. 126 "[T]he government may not,"
the court explained, "(1) compel affirmation of religious beliefs;
(2) punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be
false; (3) impose special disabilities on the basis of religious
views or religious status; or (4) lend its power to one side or the

124. Parker, 514 F.3d at 102 (citing cases).
125. Id. at 100-01. A related point worth discussion is that in many cases
challenging public schools' observance of religious teachings or practices, the U.S.
Supreme Court has found such practices unconstitutional on the grounds that a schoolsponsored religious exercise has a powerful and even coercive effect on students, given
the role that the public school plays in the lives of students. See generally, Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doc, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992);
Wallace v. Jaffrec, 172 U.S. 38 (1985); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, :371
U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, :no U.S. 421 (1962). Some argue that this doctrine
smacks of inconsistency when compared with courts' reluctance to prohibit schools from
teaching messages that they find conflict with their own religious views, which they
then view as antireligious. The distinction, however, is borne out of the unique respect
in our nation's constitutional jurisprudence for the preservation of religion and its
independence from government control or intrusion, embodied substantially in the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In Engle, the Court observed that the
"first and most immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause] rest[sj on the belief
that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade
religion." 370 U.S. at 4:~1. Accordingly, "[wjhen the power, prestige and financial
support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief," the Court
explained, "the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the
prevailing officially approved religion is plain." ld. Engel remains a reminder of how
the Establishment Clause aims to preserve the sanctity and independence of religion
as much as the integrity of government. Accordingly, the complained of different
treatment is granted precisely because of the sacred place in our jurisprudence for
religious freedom.
126. Parker, 511 F.3d at 10:3.
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other in controversies over religious authorities or dogma." 127
Additionally, while careful to avoid identifying exactly what
actions would amount to a violation, the court noted that the
boys were not forced to read a "constant stream" of books
affirmatively
advancing
marriage
between
same-sex
partners. 12X The Parker court's conception was reflected as well
in the Sixth Circuit's Mozert decision, which by negative
implication also shed light on the kinds of activities that might
trigger an opt-out requirement under the Free Exercise Clause:
forcing the student to engage in an act that violated her or his
religion, the "affirmation or denial of a religious belief," or to
engage in "performance or non-performance of a religious
exercise or practice." 129

VI. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND GREATER CERTAINTY FOR
SCHOOLS AND PARENTS?

The connection between recognition of same-sex marriage
and public schools is, as explained above, attenuated. However,
discussions regarding alleged negative implications beg the
question of whether there are positive implications. This is
admittedly a point for further exploration, but some discussion
of this topic is warranted here.
127. !d.
128. !d. at 106-07.
129. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1987).
Additionally, though not addressing Free Exercise claims, the District of Maryland's
2005 decision in Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Public
Schools identified aspects of a curriculum that ran afoul of the Constitution. No. AW·
05·1194, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 81:cJO, at *28-*32 (D. Md. May 5, 2005). Where the
curriculum refuted religious beliefs regarding the moral rightness of homosexuality,
preferred religions that viewed homosexuality favorably, and criticized religions that
condemned homosexuality, the curriculum did not comport with the tenets of the
Establishment Clause, the court explained. !d. The court additionally opined that the
school's curriculum violated the First Amendment's prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination, indicating that the failure to provide a balanced range of views on
homosexuality violated the First Amendment. !d. at *32-*35. While the court's
Establishment Clause reasoning is cogent, the weight of the court's free speech
reasoning is less certain. The Supreme Court has held that schools may limit school
sponsored speech for legitimate pedagogical reasons. Ha?:elwood v. Kuhlmeier, 481 U.S.
260, 27::3 (1988). The First Circuit recognized that encouragement of acceptance for
diversity, including diversity based on sexual orientation, is a significant interest for a
public school. And in Mozert, the Sixth Circuit rejected the theory that schools must be
made to provide balanced information regarding sexuality, noting that balance in
religious terms was impossibly subjective and that efforts to seek religious balance
might tread impermissibly into the territory of actions aimed at or with the primary
effect of advancing religion or of excessive entanglement. 827 F.2d at 1061-65.
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Where same-sex parents are prohibited from marrying,
some same-sex partners raismg children are-unlike
heterosexual couples-prohibited from becoming a legal parent
to the children whose upbringing they share. 130 A significant
group-some estimate up to two-thirds-of children being
raised in households by same-sex couples live in areas where
one of their parents cannot form a legal relationship to them
due to marriage or adoption inequality. 131 Children denied the
rights to a legal relationship with one of their parents are also
denied the security that comes with that relationship,
including the right of support after parental separation,
benefitting from employer-provided health benefits, survivor
benefits, and others. 132 Recognition of same-sex marital
relationships between adults caring for school children might
very well bring those children greater certainty and security. 133
From the perspective of school-related parental rights, a
same-sex partner caring for a child might experience obstacles
to exercising parental rights regarding the child if unable to
become the child's legal parent due to marriage inequality. For
example, the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA) grants parents the right to access their children's
education records, to challenge the content of student records,
and to release the records, among other rights. 134 The statute
defines a "parent" as a natural parent, a guardian, or an
individual acting as a parent in the absence of a parent or a

130. Many states permit the adoption of ~hildren by same-sex couples, but in some
states, refusal to recognize same-sex marriage creates barriers to legal parenthood. For
example, North Carolina does not permit same-sex marriage. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 51-1.2
(2009). And if an adoption petitioner is unmarried, no other person may join the
adoption petition. ld. § 48-2-:JOl(c). A step-parent may adopt a step-child. ld. § 18-1-101
(2010). And a child born of artificial insemination is the legal child of the husband and
wife employing such technique. !d. § 49A-1 (2009). Additionally, Utah's constitution
bans same-sex marriage, and its adoption statutes prohibit adoption of a child by any
adult cohabitating in a relationship outside of marriage. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29;
UTAH Com; ANN. § 7813-6-117(3) (LexisNexis 2010). Oklahoma's Constitution prohibits
same-sex marriage, and its statutes permit adoption by single adults and married
couples only. OKLA. CONS'!'. art. IT, § 35(A)-(B); OKLA. STAT. tit.lO, § 7508-1.1 (2009).
Accordingly, in some states, marriage provides parental rights unavailable to same-sex
partners raising children.
131. LISA DENNETT & GA]{Y J. GATES, HUMAN HIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, THE
COST OF MARRIAGE INEQUALITY TO CHILDREN AND THE!]{ SAME-SEX i'AHENTS 7 (20()1),
available at http://www.hrc.org/documents/costkids.pdf.
132. ld. at 8-12.
133. !d. at 13.
134. 20 u.s.c. § 1232g (2006).
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guardian. 135 A school could conceivably release student records
to a non-legal parent same-sex partner caregiver by treating
that person as an "individual acting as a parent" within the
meaning of the regulations, but the ambiguity of the phrase
and the recognition of the parental relationship might likely
create unwanted uncertainty for parents and schools. 136
Similar concerns apply to same-sex partner caregivers to
children eligible for services under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act. 137 In intact relationships, these
obstacles can often be ameliorated by legal parent
authorization, but the matter of records access and parental
decision-making
intensifies
in
emergencies,
if such
relationships sever, or in the event of the loss of the legally
recognized parent. Additionally, matters of custody might be
more complicated for schools, such as when there are disputes
between same-sex parents or when the legal parent is unable to
care for the child. By recognizing as marital partners same-sex
parent couples who wish to enter the institution, states could
ameliorate this uncertainty, which creates unnecessary
ambiguity for families and schools alike.

VII. CONCLUSION
If in coming years curricular shifts are observed relating to
the acknowledgment of same-sex relationships and reduction of
sexual orientation discrimination, those trends will likely be
due more to social transformation than to any legal change
recognizing the right to marry for same-sex couples. Those who
wish to remove their children from classes relating to the topic
may have options for doing so where their desire is consistent
with the pluralist nature of American public schools. However,
the debate surrounding same-sex marriage and public schools
implicates parental rights in other ways as well. Refusal to
recogmze marnage relationships, when combined with

135. :!4 C. F.H. § 99.:i (201 0).
136. !d.
137. See 20 U.S.C. § 1101(23) (2006) ("The term 'parent' includes- (A) a natural,
adoptive, or foster parent (unless a foster parent is prohibited by State law from
serving as a parent); (B) a guardian (but not the State if the child is a ward of the
State); (C) an individual acting in the place of a natural or adoptive parent (including a
grandparent, stepparent, or other relative) with whom the child lives, or an individual
legally responsible for the child's welfare .... ").
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adoption laws, may in some jurisdictions deny same-sex
parents and their children benefits enjoyed by families
parented by married heterosexuals.

